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INTRODUCTION

An emerging issue in trademark law was brought up in a case when World
Champ Tech (WCT) alleged that Peloton Interactive, Inc. (Peloton) infringed on
their registered trademark “Bike+”.1 The case was filed on April 30, 2021, in the
U.S. District Court, Northern District of California.2 WCT is a company that
focuses on developing “the world’s best workout apps.”3 WCT developed the
app, Bike+, as a way to record and manage a cyclist’s progress and activities; they
filed for a trademark registration of Bike+ in November of 2013.4 The United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) officially registered the mark in the
principle register on July 28, 2015, and WCT has been using the mark ever since.5
Peloton was founded in 2012 and it wanted to “bring the community and
excitement of boutique fitness into the home.”6 Peloton became popular for
their indoor stationary bicycles.7 In September 2020, Peloton launched a new
model of its stationary bikes called “Bike+.”8 Peloton’s use of Bike+ refers to
the bike model itself, but WCT notes that Peloton’s Bike+ has an interactive
screen that can be used to access Peloton’s fitness apps.9 These apps are able to
record data similarly to WCT’s Bike+ app.10 Peloton’s use and promotion of the
term Bike+, in relation to their new bike model, has led to the current trademark
infringement claim.11
Peloton should never have been sued because there should never have been a
trademark infringement case to begin with. WCT should not have been able to
register “Bike+”. The PTO erred by granting the registration. The term “Bike+”
should not be a protectable mark under trademark law. To correct this issue,

Complaint at 5, World Champ Tech LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-03202
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2021).
2 Id. at 1.
3 About Us, WORLD CHAMP TECH, https://www.worldchamptech.com/about (last visited
Sept. 29, 2021).
4 BIKE+, Registration No. 4782695.
5 Id.
6 The Peloton Story, PELOTON, https://www.onepeloton.com/company (last visited Sept. 29,
2021).
7 Tom Huddleston, How Peloton Exercise Bikes Became a $4 Billion Fitness Start-up with a Cult
Following, CNBC (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/12/howpeloton-exercise-bikes-and-streaming-gained-a-cult-following.html.
8 Kirsten Errick, Peloton Sued for Infringement of Bike+ Mark, L. ST. (May 3, 2021),
https://lawstreetmedia.com/tech/peloton-sued-for-infringement-of-bike-mark/.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
1
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Peloton should petition to cancel the trademark, a process Peloton has relied on
in past disputes.12
This Note will begin by discussing the characteristics of a trademark and the
categories of distinctiveness that are used to classify marks. Part II will then
discuss relevant case law that can be analogized to the current issue. There will
also be a discussion of the appropriate steps the PTO must take when responding
to an application for registration and possible solutions to the current issue.
Part III will focus on where “Bike+” falls on the distinctiveness spectrum.
Whether or not the PTO made an error depends on where “Bike+” falls on the
spectrum. This Note will conclude by determining that the PTO did err by
granting the registration because “Bike+” is not inherently distinctive and WCT
has not proven secondary meaning.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TRADEMARK LAW AND DISTINCTIVENESS

A trademark, as defined in the Lanham Act of 1946, is “any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that is “used by a person . . . to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”13
People or companies can become trademark owners as soon as they start using
the mark with specific goods or services.14 Registering a trademark on the
Principal Register with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is
optional, but registering does come with broader rights and protections for the
owner than unregistered marks.15 To qualify for registration, a trademark must
fall into a certain protectable category.16
For a trademark to be registered with the PTO and gain the protections, the
mark must be considered distinctive.17 “Distinctive” is a term of art under
trademark law and is the defining characteristic of a valid trademark; a
designation cannot be considered a mark unless it has distinctiveness.18 Section

See generally Petition to Cancel, at 1, Cancellation Proceeding Number 92076483, (T.T.A.B.
Feb. 16, 2021) (demonstrating that Peloton knows how to petition to cancel a registration
because the company is currently trying to cancel Mad Dogg Athletics’ Spinning® mark).
13 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
14
What
is
a
Trademark?,
USPTO
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/what-trademark.
15 Id.
16
Strong
Trademarks,
USPTO
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/strong-trademarks.
17
Wex
Definitions
Team,
Distinctive
Trademark,
LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/distinctive_trademark (last updated June 2020).
18 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:2
(5th ed. 2021).
12
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2 of the Lanham Act states that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of the
applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register.”19
The strength of a trademark is sorted into four different categories: 1) generic,
2) descriptive, 3) suggestive, and 4) fanciful or arbitrary.20 Fanciful, arbitrary, and
suggestive designations are all considered inherently distinctive and are
automatically considered valid marks.21 Descriptive designations are not
inherently distinctive, but they can still be protected as registered trademarks if
the owner is able to prove that consumers associate the designation with the
owner’s product or service.22 This proof shows that the mark has “secondary
meaning.”23 Descriptive designations that do not have secondary meaning, as
well as generic designations, can never be trademarks.24
Fanciful or arbitrary trademarks are the strongest marks.25 Fanciful marks are
entirely made-up terms that the trademark owner created to describe their
product or service; these include Pepsi®, relating to soft drinks,26 or Google®,
relating to online services.27 These marks have the greatest amount of protection
because they require a larger and more expensive effort to educate the public on
what this new word refers to.28
Arbitrary marks are in the same category as fanciful marks and also receive
the highest amount of protection.29 Arbitrary trademarks are words that have
common meanings, but that word is unrelated to the product or service that the
mark is used for.30 Apple® for computers is a famous example of an arbitrary
mark because the term “apple” is a common word for a fruit, but relating to
computers, the mark is unique.31
Suggestive marks are the second strongest type of trademark.32 These marks
suggest a quality of the goods or services being provided without openly stating

15 U.S.C. § 1052.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
21 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18.
22 Id.; see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (stating that
descriptive marks may acquire distinctiveness if the mark has “become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods in commerce”).
23 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18.
24 Id.
25 USPTO, supra note 14.
26 Id.
27 Trademark Strength, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, https://www.inta.org/fact-sheets/trademarkstrength/ (Nov. 5, 2020).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 USPTO, supra note 14.
32 Id.
19
20
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the quality.33 Examples of suggestive marks include Coppertone®, which
describes a suntanning oil that will make your skin a copper color34, and Airbus®,
which describes an airplane used for transport.35
Descriptive marks are not inherently distinctive but can acquire
distinctiveness through secondary meaning.36 Descriptive marks do as they
suggest and only describe the product they are associated with.37 According to
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, “[a] mark is merely
descriptive if it immediately conveys to one seeing or hearing it knowledge of the
ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of the goods or services with which it is
used.”38 To be a registered trademark, the mark must have secondary meaning.39
Examples of descriptive marks that have secondary meaning, and are registered
trademarks, are Sharp® for televisions and Holiday Inn® for hotel services.40
Generic terms are words that the general public thinks of as the common
name for a good or the genus of the product.41 These terms can never be
protected as trademarks.42 Generic terms cannot be registered as trademarks
because they do not serve the function of distinguishing one producer’s goods
from another.43 Another way to determine if a mark is generic is to look at how
the proponent of the trademark uses the term.44
If companies were allowed to register generic terms, other competitors would
have a difficult time entering that market; they would have trouble conveying
what their product is to the consumers.45 An example would be if a company
was able to register the term “pen” for their product, a pen. Their competitors
would have trouble selling their pens because they would not be able to market
them as pens; they would need to describe the product with longer, more
convoluted titles.46

Id.
Id.
35 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 27.
36 Id.; see Park ‘N Fly, Inc., v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (holding that
a descriptive mark “may be registered only if the registrant shows that it has acquired
secondary meaning, i.e., it ‘has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce’”)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)).
37 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, Supra note 27.
38 In the Matter of the Application of Quik-Print Copy Shops, Inc., 616 F.2d 523, 525
(C.C.P.A. 1980).
39 Id.
40 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 27.
41 USPTO, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.01(c)(i) (2021).
42 Id.
43 1 JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.02(2) (2021).
44 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18 at § 12:13.
45 Id.
46 Id.
33
34
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With classifications of marks, it is important for lawyers and courts to draw
the line between a descriptive mark and a suggestive mark.47 The tests that courts
use to determine if a mark is suggestive or descriptive are the imagination test,
the competitors’ usage and need test, and usage by the media and dictionaries.48
The most common test—and the test that will be used later in the analysis—is
the imagination test.49
With this test, the more imagination that the customer must use to get some
description of the good, the more likely the mark is suggestive and not merely
descriptive.50 Judge Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York formulated
the test as “[a] term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods. A term is
descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities
or characteristics of the goods.”51
To determine if there is enough imagination to make a mark suggestive,
courts will look at how direct and immediate the link between the mark and the
product is for consumers.52 Suggestive marks will require a “multi-stage
reasoning process” to go from the mark to an attribute of the product.53
While a court might have to go through more steps to determine if a mark is
descriptive or suggestive, it can determine that a term is generic if it refers to a
key aspect of the product.54 Courts have had difficulty, however, when
determining if a term that refers to an aspect of the product is generic or if it is
descriptive.55 Although there is debate on this determination, the result is the
same: the mark is not inherently distinctive.56 As previously discussed, generic
terms can never be registered trademarks, and descriptive marks can only be
registered if they acquired secondary meaning.

See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (discussing how
suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are deemed inherently distinctive and are
automatically protected); In re MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“Although the dividing lines are not always clear, the distinctions are critical in a registration
determination.”).
48 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18 at § 11:66.
49 Id. at § 11:67.
50 Id.
51 Id. (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968)).
52 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18 at § 11:67.
53 Id. (quoting In re Tennis in the Round, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 496 (T.T.A.B. 1978)).
54 1 GILSON, supra note 43 at § 2.02(6)(a) (citing Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d
1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
55 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18 at § 12:20.
56 Id.
47
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B. ROLE OF PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE EXAMINING ATTORNEY

When a trademark application is filed with PTO, the application is assigned
to an examining attorney to determine if the mark is eligible for registration.57
The examiners must refuse registration to marks that merely describe the goods
or services that are provided.58 The reasons behind refusing registration to
descriptive terms is to:
(1) to prevent the owner of a mark from inhibiting competition
in the sale of particular goods; and (2) to maintain freedom of
the public to use the language involved, thus avoiding the
possibility of harassing infringement suits by the registrant
against others who use the mark when advertising or describing
their own products.59
For an examiner to refuse an application because the mark is merely
descriptive or generic, they must support the refusal with evidence.60 The law
governing refusing a registration is Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act.61 If the
mark appears to be generic, the examiner should not automatically refuse the
registration, unless the applicant incorrectly asserts in the original application that
their mark has acquired secondary meaning.62 If the mark is deemed capable of
registration but is descriptive, the examiner should provide the applicant with
advice about asserting a claim of acquired secondary meaning.63 This is done
when the mark appears to be generic or merely descriptive and the applicant has
not yet made the showing of acquired distinctiveness.64 If the applicant then
responds with a showing of secondary meaning, the examiner must review the
evidence and determine if the mark is sufficient to show the mark is distinctive.65
C. WAYS OF SHOWING THERE IS SECONDARY MEANING

An applicant must show that their mark has acquired distinctiveness to be
registered on the principal register if their mark is considered descriptive.66 Put
USPTO, Supra note 41 at § 702.01.
Id. at § 1209.
59 Id. (quoting In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
60 Id. at § 1209.02.
61 Id. (noting that § 2(e)(1) of Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1)).
62 USPTO, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.02 (2021).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
57
58
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another way, an applicant must show that their mark has secondary meaning to
show that their mark is not generic. This is done by showing that the main
significance of the term to consumers is the producer and not the product.67 The
ultimate question becomes whether the mark being perceived by the consumers
as a common name for the goods or being perceived as identifying the good’s
source.68
Each Circuit Court has identified a version of a multifactor test to determine
if there is secondary meaning.69 A detailed test came out in 2021 from the court
in Snyder’s Lance that identified twelve factors to consider: dictionary definitions;
usage by plaintiffs; usage by competitors, industry insiders, and others; media
references; press releases, other plaintiff created references, or business
references; lawsuit references; false positive and intermediate references; generic
references; “brand” identification references; consumer surveys; Google and
social media references; and other available product names.70
Consumer surveys are often considered to be the best evidence for proving
secondary meaning.71 The standard format for a survey was developed in 197572
and is known as the “Teflon Survey”.73 The survey teaches the respondent the
difference between a trademark and a common name and then asks the
respondents how they perceive certain terms.74 This is a valuable tool that
applicants can use to show their mark has acquired distinctiveness. The surveys,
however, must be designed and interpreted with care because the words that are
used can have different meanings and can be problematic.75

D. CASE LAW EXAMINING GENERICNESS

1. Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.
It is not a new concept that adding a generic designation to a generic term
does not make that term distinct. In Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear
Rubber Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that adding the term “company” to a

Snyder’s Lance, Inc. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., 542 F. Supp. 3d 371, 381 (W.D.N.C. 2021) (citing
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)).
68 Id. (citing Princeton Vangaurd, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. 786 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir.
2015)).
69 Converse, Inc. v. ITC Sketchers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
70 Synder’s Lance, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 386-405.
71 3 JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 8.03(3)(b)(iii) (2021).
72 See generally E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l., 393 F. Supp. 502, 525-26
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (describing the formulation of a test to evaluate the distinctiveness of the
TEFLON brand).
73 3 GILSON, supra note 71 at § 8.03(3)(b)(iv)(B)(I).
74 Id.
75 Id. (citing U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020)).
67
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descriptive or generic term does not make it protectable.76 At the time,
“Goodyear Rubber” was a descriptive term relating to a general good that was
made with “Goodyear’s Invention”.77 The court equated the use of “company”
in this case to hypotheticals of companies being named “Wine Company”,
“Cotton Company”, or “Grain Company”.78 The court held that adding the term
“company” to a name of a product that is in commerce, without any other
specification, does not entitle the mark to exclusive rights.79
2. In Re Hotels.com
This concept was brought up again 121 years later in In Re Hotels.com, L.P.80
In this case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) rejected the
registration for the mark “HOTELS.COM” on the grounds that the mark was a
generic term for the services provided.81 The applicant argued that
HOTELS.COM was not a generic term because (1) the mark is identifying an
information source and travel agency, not an actual hotel, and (2) the term is not
just “hotel”, and the “.com” part of the term negates the genericness.82 The
TTAB in this case determined that “hotels” names a key part of the service the
applicant was providing and that adding “.com” to the name did not produce a
new meaning.83
3. In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC
Decided by the Federal Circuit in the same year as In re Hotels.com, this case
also addresses the problems with adding “.com” to a generic term.84 In this case,
Dial-A-Mattress appealed a TTAB decision to reject MATTRESS.COM from
registration.85 The court looked at whether MATTRESS.COM was a generic
term, and the court used the following test to make that determination: “[f]irst,
what is the genus of goods or services at issue? Second, is the term sought to be
registered or retained on the register understood by the relevant public primarily
to refer to that genus of goods or services?”86
The parties in the case agreed that the genus of the services was “online retail
store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding.”87 To consider the
128 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1888).
Id. at 602.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 603.
80 In Re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
81 Id. at 1301.
82 Id. at 1301, 1303.
83 Id. at 1304.
84 In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
85 Id. at 1360-61.
86 Id. at 1363 (quoting H. Marvin Ginn Corp.v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987,
990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
87 Id.
76
77
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genericness of the mark, the TTAB first looked at the terms of the mark
separately.88 TTAB determined that “mattress” identified a key aspect of DialA-Mattress’s service, and therefore was generic for the services provided;89 that
is, “mattress” referred to the genus of the service.90 The TTAB also determined
that “.com” is simply an abbreviation to indicate an organization in internet
addresses and is generic.91
Once the components of the mark were analyzed separately, the TTAB then
looked at the mark as a whole.92 The TTAB concluded that the combination of
the components did not add any new meaning to the term, making the term as a
whole generic.93 The court agreed with the analysis that the TTAB did to
determine the genericness of the mark.94
4. Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc.
This case came out one year after In re 1800Mattress.com and used the same
reasoning from that case.95 Advertise.com discussed a district court’s holding that
AOL’s mark, ADVERTISING.COM, is a descriptive mark and can be
protected.96 The Ninth Circuit ultimately disagreed with this finding and
determined that ADVERTISING.COM was generic.97 The Ninth Circuit
mirrored what the Federal Circuit did in In re 1800Mattress.com and looked at the
components of the mark separately to determine if the components were generic
by themselves.98
The court concluded that “advertising” was a generic term by looking at the
dictionary definition of the word.99 The court also held that “.com” “refers
‘generically to almost anything connected to business on the internet.’”100 The
court determined that ADVERTISING.COM, taken as a whole, is still a generic
term.101
AOL argued that because only one entity can own a domain name at a time,
adding “.com” to a generic term will actually denote source.102 The court
Id.
Id. at 1361.
90 In re 1800Mattress.com IP, 586 F.3d at 1363.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1362-63.
95 Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the
analysis will look to what the genus of the service is and then analyze the mark separately first).
96 Id. at 976.
97 Id. at 981-82.
98 Id. at 977.
99 Id. at 977-78.
100 Id. at 978.
101 Advertise.com, 616 F.3d at 978-79.
102 Id. at 980.
88
89
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disagreed with this argument because it would create a per se rule that adding
“.com” to a generic term will make that mark protectable.103 Precedent showed
that the PTO, TTAB, and Federal Circuit have all rejected this argument because
it would give the owner of the mark rights to more than just the intellectual
property of the domain name.104
5. United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com
In 2020, the “generic.com” case United States Patent and Trademark Office v.
Booking.com B.V.105 reached the Supreme Court. “Booking.com” is another hotel
information and travel agency website, like hotels.com.106 The company applied
to register “Booking.com”, but the PTO rejected the application.107 The PTO
found that the term was generic and, thus, the mark could not be registered.108
The PTO tried to impose a per se rule that said combining a generic term with
“.com” is still generic.109
Booking.com sought review in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia.110 Booking.com was able to introduce more evidence and was able
to show the court that the mark was descriptive and had acquired secondary
meaning.111 The PTO appealed the part of the decision that determined
“Booking.com” was not generic.112 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court’s decision and likewise rejected the PTO’s assertion
that adding “.com” to a generic term necessarily makes the term generic.113 The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings and further held that this is not
a correct rule to apply to all cases because the PTO has not followed this rule in
the past when granting registration; the proposed rule would lead to the potential
cancellation of previously registered trademarks.114 The Court did admit there
are some cases where this is true, but the rule was not automatic.115
The Court looked at several different factors to determine whether
“Booking.com” was a generic or descriptive term.116 The first factor was

Id.
Id. at 980-81 (stating that allowing this per se rule would allow the owner to claim protection
over almost any use of the generic term in a domain name).
105 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020).
106 Id. at 2303.
107 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2301 (2020).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 2303.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2304.
114 Id. at 2305.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2304.
103
104
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determining whether the mark named a class of goods or services.117 The second
factor was that, when a compound term is used, the distinctiveness test must rely
on the meaning of the term as a whole.118 The third factor, and perhaps the most
important in the case, was how consumers viewed the mark.119 The Supreme
Court held, and the PTO eventually conceded, that consumers understood that
“Booking.com” referred to a specific company.120
The PTO still urged that adding “.com” to a generic term should not make it
distinctive.121 They relied on the holding in Goodyear that adding “company” to a
generic term does not make the mark distinctive.122 The PTO argued that just as
adding “company” to a generic term does not add any additional meaning that
would distinguish the goods from other producer’s, adding “.com” to a generic
term also does not add any additional meaning.123
The Court in this case disagreed with the PTO’s reasoning.124 The Court held
that “company” and “.com” are not the same because “.com” indicates a
“source-identifying characteristic: an association with a particular website.”125
Website domains can only be owned by one entity, meaning that when a
consumer thinks about a “generic.com” they can be thinking about a particular
website or particular producer of a good or service.126 Therefore, a website name
like Booking.com may distinguish their services from other providers and can be
descriptive.127
The main takeaways from Booking.com are: (1) adding “.com” to a generic term
does not always make the whole term generic,128 (2) the distinctiveness of the
term is dependent on the consumers’ beliefs,129 and (3) there is a difference
between adding company and adding “.com” to a generic term.130
If In re Hotels.com, In re 1800Mattress.com, and Advertise.com were heard after
Booking.com was decided, those cases might have had different outcomes. The
courts in those cases seemed to follow a rule more closely related to what the
PTO advocated for in Booking.com where adding a generic term to another generic
term will make that whole term generic. The Court in Booking.com looked at the

Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2304.
Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2305.
121 Id.
122 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2305.
123 Id. at 2306.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2304-05.
128 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2307.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2306.
117
118
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mark in the context of consumer perception.131 Had the courts in In re Hotels.com,
In re 1800Mattress.com, and Advertise.com followed the Booking.com approach, they
might have come to the conclusion that because the public perceives those marks
to be associated with one company, the marks could be descriptive with
secondary meaning. For a full analysis, those courts could have looked deeper at
the public perception of the individual marks.
E. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE +

The use of the plus sign “+” in company names dates back to at least 1984
with the introduction of the French television channel, Canal+.132 The trend did
make it to mainstream companies until Google introduced its Google+ platform
that was active from 2011 to 2019.133 The + has since become a common symbol
used in the name of streaming services.134 Other industries from clothing brands
to vineyards to law firms have moved to using the + in their names.135
Based on trademark precedent, including Booking.com, how the public
perceives the + is important.136 As of the late 2010s, the + has been used
frequently with streaming services and has become somewhat synonymous with
these types of services.137 Despite this connection, however, many professionals
in the branding field do not believe the + adds much value to a brand name, if
any at all; Laurel Sutton, the cofounder of the brand-naming agency Catchword,
said “[the +] doesn’t tell you anything at all. It doesn’t tell you what you’re getting;

Id. at 2307.
Tiffany Hsu, Why Plus Is a Minus When Naming Your Streaming Site, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/25/business/media/streaming-platforms-plussigns.html (last updated Feb. 26, 2021).
133 Id.
134 Id. (including examples, such as ESPN+, Apple TV+, Disney+, BET+, AMC+,
Discovery+).
135 Katy Steinmetz, From Disney+ to PB+J, How the Plus Sign Took Over the World, TIME (Feb. 27,
2020, 1:58 PM), https://time.com/5791267/plus-sign-brands-ampersand/.
136 Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. at 2304 (“[T]he relevant meaning of a term is its meaning to
consumers.”).
137 See Hsu, supra note 132 (“[T]he plus sign has become an all-purpose marker that signals
endless hours of on-demand shows.”); Nancy Friedman, What Do Plus Signs Add?,
THINKMAP
VISUAL
THESAURAUS
(July
15,
2021),
https://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/candlepwr/what-do-plus-signs-add/
(“‘+’
had
become a familiar signifier for ‘streaming,’ just as the e- and i- prefixes had signified ‘electronic’
and ‘internet’”); Jeff Beer, Why Adding ‘Plus’ to the Name of Every Streaming Service is Actually Good,
FAST CO. (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90555592/why-adding-plus-tothe-name-of-every-streaming-service-is-actually-good (“That word and symbol [plus and +]
becomes a great shorthand for streaming service in the consumer’s mind.”); Steinmetz, supra
note 135 (the plus sign has become a sigil in the streaming wars).
131
132

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss2/4

14

Nasoulis: When a “+” Doesn’t Add Anything in the Equation

358

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:2

it doesn’t say why it’s different. It’s just adding a superlative on the end—like
saying ‘ultra’ or ‘supreme’ or ‘better.’”138
The + has also been described as a generic term and the “lowest common
denominator.”139 Given all these statements, there appears to be a consensus that
the + does not add any defining characteristics to a mark—unless the + is
connected to a streaming service—and should be considered generic.
F. WORLD CHAMP TECH’S MOBILE APP

World Champ Tech (WCT) uses the trademark “Bike+” relating to a
“downloadable mobile application[] for recording and managing cycling
activities.”140 Users can download Bike+ from the App Store and the app is
meant to be used with an Apple Watch.141 The app’s multiple functions allow a
person to track bicycle ride times, speeds, and distances; measure certain fitness
metrics like maximum aerobic power and oxygen use rate; survey climbs during
the ride; design workouts and have artificial intelligent coaching; and chart data
and recovery information.142 WCT’s Bike+ app does a lot to help a bicyclist know
everything they need to know about their bicycle rides.
WCT has also developed a function for the app that allows the user to add a
“quick launch complication” to their Apple Watch face.143 This feature adds a
circle to the main screen of a smart watch with just the word “Bike” in the
circle.144 WCT, for some reason, dropped the + and, by using this quick launch
function, the company is only referring to their app by “Bike”.
The main function of the app is related to bikes. The app was designed to
track biking activities.145 A reasonable person could assume from the name of
the app what the app’s main functions are.

Aric Jenkins, Why Your Favorite Brand Names Are Starting to Look Like Math Problems,
FORTUNE (Apr. 27, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/04/27/branding-plus-sign/;
see also Steinmetz, supra note 135 (“[The +] suggests customers will be getting something extra
without making it at all clear what that extra thing might be.”).
139 Hsu, supra note 132.
140 BIKE+, supra note 4.
141 Bike+, WORLD CHAMP TECH, https://www.worldchamptech.com/bikeplus (last visited
Oct. 17, 2021).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
138
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III. ANALYSIS
A. ANALOGIZING “+” AND “.COM”

As of early 2022, there is no case law about adding a + to a generic or
descriptive term. Because of the lack of case law and the similarity of adding one
generic term to another generic term, this Note analogizes adding a + to a term
and adding “.com” to a term.
As the cases that have been discussed mentioned, adding “.com” to a generic
term does not add any source identifying characteristics to the term.146 According
to how the public perceives the +, the + also does not add any source identifying
characteristics to terms. The exception being when the + is part of a term that
relates to a streaming service.147 In this exception, terms like Disney+®,
ESPN+®, and BET+® are able to convey the message that the term is
associated with a streaming service.148 WCT’s app is not a streaming service,
however, so adding a + to a term like “Bike” can be analogous to adding “.com”
to a term like “hotels”.
The analysis that the courts used in the cases relating to “.com” and generic
terms can be used to analyze “Bike+”. Following In re 1800Mattress.com and
Advertise.com, this analysis requires examining each component of the term
separately before looking at the term as a whole.149 This is where the public
perception of the + becomes important.
This method is beneficial because adding a generic symbol to an already strong
mark will make that new term eligible for trademark registration.150 An example
is Google+®. The trademark Google® is a strong and has been a protected mark
since being registered in 2012.151 Because Google was already protected and
already a strong mark, when the company added a + to the name, the mark was
still a strong mark because the mark was analyzed as a whole. Even if the + did

See supra secs. II(d)(2)-(4) (discussing the cases and how adding “.com” did not allow the
generic term to be considered descriptive).
147 Nancy Friedman, What Do Plus Signs Add?, THINKMAP VISUAL THESAURAUS (July
15, 2021), https://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/candlepwr/what-do-plus-signs-add/.
148 Id.
149 See In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing that
the TTAB in that case looked at “mattress” and “.com” separately at first); Advertise.com,
Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e are permitted to
begin our inquiry by separately viewing the component parts of the mark.”).
150 See Jenkins, supra note 138 (describing how using the + with a strong and well-known
trademark, like Disney, does not add anything new and Disney was not “‘try[ing] to reinvent
the wheel’”).
151
Trademark
Electric
Search
System
(TESS),
USPTO,
https://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=searchss&state=4801:o1xl21.1.1 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2021) (Type in search bar the registration number “4168118”. Use the drop-down
menu for field and change to “Serial or Registration Number” and click “Submit Query”.).
146

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol29/iss2/4

16

Nasoulis: When a “+” Doesn’t Add Anything in the Equation

360

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 29:2

not add any value or any source identifying information, the trademark
Google+® was still registerable because Google was already registered.
1. Putting “Bike” on the Spectrum of Distinctiveness
Using this method, if “Bike” is a strong trademark, then “Bike+” can be
registered with no issue. For ease, this analysis begins at the strongest end of the
distinctiveness spectrum and work down. Thus, the analysis will start by looking
at whether Bike+ falls in the fanciful category and work down to looking at
whether Bike+ is generic.
It is likely that “Bike” is not a made-up term like Pepsi® or Google®, where
the main purpose of the term was to become a trademark.152 According to
Merriam Webster, the dictionary definition of “Bike” is “bicycle”153, and the
definition of “bicycle” is “a vehicle with two wheels tandem, handlebars for
steering, a saddle seat, and pedals by which it is propelled.”154 Because “Bike” is
not a made up term and is a word in the dictionary, the word cannot fall in the
category of coined or fanciful terms on the trademark distinctiveness spectrum.
The next step would be to determine if “Bike” can be considered an arbitrary
mark. An arbitrary mark must be a commonly used word that is unrelated to the
product, like Apple® for computers.155 For “Bike” to be an arbitrary mark for
an app, the app could not be related to bicycles. WCT’s app, however, is directly
related to bicycles and users’ workouts while riding bicycles156; therefore, “Bike”
cannot be considered an arbitrary mark.
The last inherently distinctive category of marks is suggestive marks. As
discussed earlier, the most common test used for determining whether a mark is
distinctive or suggestive is the imagination test from Judge Weinfeld.157 For the
mark to be suggestive, consumers must go through multiple stages of thought to
get from “Bike” to WCT’s app.
An example of a suggestive mark that requires imagination is Penguin® for
food freezers158; a consumer will need to go from thinking about penguins, to
freezing cold environments, and finally to a food freezer. Another example is
Samson® for weight training machines159; a consumer would need to go from
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 11:5 (stating that coined or fanciful marks are words
that were created for the sole purpose of becoming a trademark).
153 Bike, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/bike (last visited
Oct. 21, 2021).
154 Id.
155 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 27.
156 Bike+, WORLD CHAMP TECH, https://www.worldchamptech.com/bikeplus (last visited
Oct. 17, 2021).
157 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:2
(5th ed. 2021) (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,
488 (S.D. N.Y. 1968)).
158 Id. at § 11:67.
159 Id.
152

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

17

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 4

2022]

EFFECT OF THE “+” ON TRADEMARK LAW

361

thinking about Samson, to remembering that Samson is a Biblical character, to
thinking about his superhuman strength, to thinking about getting strong, and
finally to weight training equipment.
Looking now to how “Bike” relates to WCT’s app, a consumer does not need
to go through this type of thought process to connect the term and the app.
Because “Bike” “conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or
characteristics of the goods,”160 the required imagination is not needed. A
consumer can see the mark “Bike”, think of riding a bicycle, and then connect
riding a bicycle to an app that tracks their data while riding a bicycle. Consumers
will not have to make a large mental leap from the mark to the product or service.
Therefore, “Bike” cannot be considered a suggestive term.
If WCT’s mark was simply “Bike” and not “Bike+”, the mark would not be
inherently distinctive. This means that the mark is not protected without at least
a showing of secondary meaning. Determining whether a mark is descriptive or
generic depends on if the mark conveys to a consumer the ingredients, qualities,
or characteristics of the good or service,161 or if the mark refers to the genus of
the good or service.162 The genus of the good may be defined by using the
applicant’s description of the good or service.163
WCT’s application says the goods or services the mark is used for are:
Downloadable mobile applications for recording and managing
cycling activities, namely, the rider's average and maximum
speed, rider's average and maximum power, heart rate,
geographic route taken, outside air temperature, altercations with
aggressive drivers, rider-entered route conditions, taking photos
and uploading the same to an external computer server for
personal review and viewing by others.164
The genus of the good is a mobile app that tracks a bicyclist’s data during a bike
ride. “Bike+”, just by the name alone, cannot really be thought of as referring to
this genus. If the good was a mobile app that sells bikes, then there could be a
stronger argument that “Bike+” refers to the genus because bikes are being sold.
This reasoning follows that in In re 1800Mattress.com.165

Id. (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
161 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 11:19.
162 USPTO, supra note 41.
163 Id. at § 1209.01(c)(i).
164 BIKE+, supra note 4.
165 In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
160
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In that case, the court determined that the genus was “online retail store
services in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding.”166 The court held that
“mattress” in the mark MATTRESS.COM referred to the mattresses in the
genus.167 This means that if the genus was a mobile app selling bikes, “Bike” in
the mark would refer to the bikes in the genus and make the term generic.
Because the genus is a mobile app that tracks data during a bike ride, however,
then “Bike” would probably not qualify as generic under this type of analysis.
There is still a possibility that “Bike” can be a generic term if the term “refers
to a key aspect” of the genus. this standard will sometimes cross the line into a
descriptive analysis.168 The term can be generic if the public understands the term
refers to part of the genus, even if the public does not understand the term to
refer to the genus as a whole.169 For this analysis to be conclusive, the public’s
perception of the mark “Bike” would need to be assessed in relation to the genus
of WCT’s app.
Another factor that could weigh in favor of “Bike+” being generic is how
WCT uses the mark.170 WCT included the quick launch function for their app.171
This function puts a circle on the main screen of the watch with just the word
“Bike” in the circle.172 WCT is referring to their “Bike+” app as simply “Bike”
when users use this function. The user will see the word “Bike” and know that
it is the button they need to select if they want to track their bike ride. Because
WCT uses just the word “Bike” to refer to their app, this can be seen as the
company using the term in a generic way.
The analysis now turns to the final category of the distinctiveness spectrum
and looks at “Bike” as a descriptive mark. A descriptive mark must describe some
quality or characteristic of the good or service.173 “Bike”, in relation to the WCT’s
app, can be considered descriptive. A key characteristic of the app is that the app
can track data specifically during bike rides.174 A consumer would most likely be
able to understand “Bike” as describing this key characteristic of the app. If there
was research done to show how the public perceives “Bike” relating to the app,

In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1363.
168 1 GILSON, supra note 43, at § 2.02(6)(a) (quoting Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 892
F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
169 Royal Crown Co., 892 F.3d at 1367 (quoting In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 584, 603
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
170 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 12:13 (discussing how the plaintiff’s use of the mark can
determine genericness).
171 Bike+, WORLD CHAMP TECH, https://www.worldchamptech.com/bikeplus (last visited
Oct. 17, 2021).
172 Id.
173 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 11:19.
174 Bike+, WORLD CHAMP TECH, https://www.worldchamptech.com/bikeplus (last visited
Oct. 17, 2021).
166
167
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then this could move the term from a descriptive one to a generic one. For the
sake of this argument, “Bike” will be considered descriptive.
For the examining attorney to reject an application because the mark is merely
descriptive, they only need to show that the mark describes one specific attribute
of the good or service175; they do not need to show anyone else was using the
mark, or that the mark describes all of the functions or characteristics of the
good or service.176 Therefore, “Bike” would be a descriptive mark and would be
rejected.
2. Looking at the + by Itself
By determining that “Bike,” on its own, is not a strong, protectable trademark,
the mark is not on the same level as Google® and Google+®. If “Bike” was a
strong mark like Google®, then the analysis would be over and “Bike+” could
be protected without any showing anything more. The analysis, however, is not
finished and must continue by looking at whether the + provides something
extra to the meaning of the term for Bike+ to be eligible for trademark
registration.
The + needs to add something to the mark to make the mark inherently
distinctive. If the + cannot add something to the mark, then WCT would have
to at least show the mark has secondary meaning for the mark to be protected.
This is where the public perception of the + becomes important to the analysis.
As with “Bike”, it would be beneficial to look at the + by itself to determine what
it means, to see how it can change the mark. As previously discussed, the + has
been associated with streaming sites,177 but the + has also been described as a
superlative, like ultra or supreme.178 The + has also even been described as
generic.179 For trademarks to be protectable and effective, they need to have
some kind of source identifying characteristic.180 According to professionals in
marketing and the general public, the + does not have any source identifying
characteristic, other than potentially letting the consumer know the product is a
streaming service. WTC’s Bike+ app is not a streaming service like the ones that
use the +.181 Because the + does not have any source identifying characteristics
and is considered a generic term, the + cannot be protected with a trademark
registration on its own.

USPTO, supra note 41, at § 1209.01(b).
Id.
177 Friedman, supra note 147.
178 Jenkins, supra note 138.
179 Hsu, supra note 132.
180 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (stating a trademark is used “to identify and distinguish [the
consumer’s] goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods”).
181 Hsu, supra note 132 (including examples such as ESPN+, Apple TV+, Disney+, BET+,
AMC+, Discovery+).
175
176
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B. ANALYZING “BIKE+” AS A WHOLE

Since neither part of the Bike+ mark (“Bike” and “+”) can be protected as
trademarks on their own relating to WCT’s app, the mark must be analyzed as a
whole.182 To determine whether the mark as a whole is protectable, the public’s
perception of the mark plays a key role as well as the level of distinctiveness of
each term.
“Bike” is a descriptive mark at best, and the + in this instance is a generic term
that adds no source identifying characteristics, meaning, the mark as a whole can
be at best is descriptive.183 This is discussed in the Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure:
When two descriptive terms are combined, the determination of
whether the composite mark also has a descriptive significance
turns upon the question of whether the combination of terms
evokes a new and unique commercial impression. If each
component retains its descriptive significance in relation to the
goods or services, the combination results in a composite that is
itself descriptive.184
Using this method of reasoning, if “Bike” and the + were both descriptive,
and if when they were put together to form “Bike+”, they simply retained their
descriptiveness, and the mark, as a whole, would be descriptive. If WCT’s app
was a streaming service, then there might possibly be a new commercial
impression. Without this, the mark “Bike+” is merely descriptive, if not generic.
In the Booking.com case, the court held that “Booking.com” is descriptive because
the public “primarily understands that ‘Booking.com’ does not refer to a genus,
rather it is descriptive of services involving ‘booking’ available at that domain
name.”185 Following this reasoning, for “Bike+” to be a descriptive mark rather
than a generic mark, the public would need to think of the mark as describing
the service and not identifying the genus. Assuming a public survey would
confirm this impression, this analysis will treat “Bike+” as a descriptive mark.

See In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Even if each
of the constituent words in a combination mark is generic, the combination is not generic
unless the entire formulation does not add any meaning to the otherwise generic mark.”)
(quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
183 USPTO, supra note 41, at § 1209.03(d).
184 Id. (citing Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir.
2012)).
185 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2303 (2020) (quoting
Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F.Supp.3d 891, 918 (E.D. Va. 2017)).
182
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Even with this concession, “Bike+” still should not have been allowed to be
registered.
As discussed, for a merely descriptive mark to be registered, the mark must
have acquired secondary meaning.186 Section II(c) of this Note describes the
various ways that an applicant can show that their mark has acquired secondary
meaning. WCT has not shown that their mark “Bike+” has acquired secondary
meaning, and therefore, the mark cannot be considered distinctive.
C. WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED WITH THE APPLICATION

When an applicant submits an application for registration, the lawyer assigned
to examine the application must consider if the mark is merely descriptive, or if
the mark is suggestive or arbitrary.187 The examining attorney is allowed to
request any additional documents from the applicant that would clarify any
questions the examining attorney had.188 If the mark is considered merely
descriptive by the examining attorney, the application should be denied under
section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.189 This section of the Act states that no
trademark should be refused registration unless it “[c]onsists of a mark which (1)
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely
descriptive . . . .”190
The examining attorney appointed to review WCT’s application for “Bike+”
should have refused the application under this rule. The attorney should have
issued an office action with a refusal under section 2(e)(1).191 If the mark appears
to be capable of registration if not for the descriptiveness, then the examining
attorney should provide the applicant with advice about asserting a claim of
secondary meaning.192
After the examining attorney issues a refusal in the form of an office action,
the applicant has a chance to respond. If the applicant responds by arguing that
the mark is registrable without showing secondary meaning, the examining
attorney must issue a final refusal under section 2(e)(1).193 The applicant can also
respond to the office action by asserting secondary meaning under section 2(f).194
This section of the Lanham Act states that “nothing in this chapter shall prevent

186 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:25

(5th ed. 2021).
USPTO, supra note 41, at § 1209.02.
188 Id.
189 Id. at § 1209.02(a).
190 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e).
191 USPTO, supra note 41, at § 1209.02(a).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at § 1209.02(a)(ii).
187
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the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of
the applicant’s goods in commerce.”195
Relating to WCT’s application for “Bike+”, the examining attorney should
have issued a refusal under section 2(e)(1), and WCT should have had to respond
with a claim of secondary meaning under section 2(f). WCT could have shown
secondary meaning through a survey as discussed earlier or they could show
“proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use . . . for the five years before
. . . the claim of distinctiveness was made.”196
Because there was no distinctiveness claim made, there is no definite date to
look five years prior from to determine use. There should have been a
distinctiveness claim made because there should have been a refusal under
section 2(e)(1). WCT should have been required to respond with that claim under
section 2(f). Given the timeline of documents, this claim should have been made
in 2014.197 This would mean that WCT would have to show exclusive, substantial
use starting in 2009. Looking at a document titled Section 7 Request that was filed
on April 27, 2021, however, WCT asserted that the First Use Anywhere and First
Use in Commerce dates was February 21, 2014.198 Therefore, WCT was not using
“Bike+” in commerce for five years before 2014 and could not make that
assertion under section 2(f).
After WCT’s possible response under section 2(f), that would include their
evidence of secondary meaning, the examining attorney would examine the
evidence WCT provided for establishing secondary meaning.199 If the evidence
is not sufficient to establish secondary meaning, the attorney should issue a
nonfinal action refusing registration.200 Along with the nonfinal action, the
examining attorney should also explain why the evidence is not sufficient and
should suggest any other pieces of evidence that could be submitted.201 WCT
would then have another opportunity to submit evidence of secondary
meaning.202
The new evidence would then be analyzed again by the examining attorney,
and if this new evidence is sufficient, the mark would be accepted for
registration.203 If the evidence is still not sufficient, as would probably be the case
with “Bike+”, then the examining attorney can issue a final refusal.204
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
Id.
197 Id.
198 Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR), USPTO, https://tsdr.uspto.gov/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2022) (type “86127620” in the search bar, click and “Documents”, and click on
“Section 7 Request” from Apr. 27, 2021).
199 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 41, at § 1212.02(h).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
195
196
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These steps in the registration process never took place in this case. The
examining attorney granted WCT registration without any office actions, which
treated “Bike+” as an inherently distinctive mark. This is where the examining
attorney erred. They should have refused registration under section 2(e)(1) and
forced WCT to show secondary meaning under section 2(f). If the examining
attorney refused registration, then the examining attorney may have found the
evidence insufficient and refused the registration of “Bike+”.
D. POLICY RATIONALE FOR DENYING “BIKE+” AS A REGISTERED MARK

Because the PTO allowed “Bike+” to be registered without WCT showing
the mark has acquired secondary meaning, the PTO is essentially deciding that
“Bike+” is inherently distinctive.205 The PTO has given “Bike+” the same
protections and status as an arbitrary mark like Apple® and a fanciful mark like
Google®. This sets a dangerous precedent for trademarks going forward. The
PTO’s decision could be seen as establishing a nearly per se rule similar to the
rule the PTO tried to establish in Booking.com.206 The difference being that the
rule in Booking.com stated that generic.com marks are always generic,207 and the
rule in this case is that a descriptive term with a + added to it makes the term
inherently distinctive.
This rule opens the door to companies having any generic or descriptive
term—that would not be registerable by itself—as being protected and registered
by adding the + to the mark. WCT is a prime example of a company trying to
exploit this PTO ruling.
Because WCT were allowed to register “Bike+” for an app that tracks biking
activities, on May 25, 2021, WCT filed applications for “Swim+”208, “Run+”209,
“Ski+”210, “Walk+”211, and “Hike+”212. All of these marks function exactly the
same as “Bike+”; the marks all track data corresponding to the corresponding
activity. The marks are currently awaiting examination.213 Following the PTO’s
lead in allowing “Bike+” to be registered, then all of these marks should be able
to be registered as well. The marks that WCT is trying to register are all
descriptive marks, at best, for the same reasons that “Bike+” is descriptive at
best. If the PTO allows these marks to be registered, the per se rule of adding
the + to a descriptive term could be solidified.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 11:2.
U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2305 (2020).
207 Id.
208 Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR), USPTO, https://tsdr.uspto.gov/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2021) (type “90733006” into the search bar and click “Status”).
209 Id. (type “90732968” into the search bar and click “Status”).
210 Id. (type “90733038” into the search bar and click “Status”).
211 Id. (type “90733196” into the search bar and click “Status”).
212 Id. (type “90733021” into the search bar and click “Status”).
213 Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR), supra notes 202-206.
205
206
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This rule goes against the purpose of a trademark, which is to be able to
distinguish one entity’s goods from another.214 Descriptive marks are not able to
achieve this goal unless they have acquired secondary meaning. If the PTO allows
these merely descriptive marks to be registered, then any mark that includes a +
will be registerable even if the mark does not have any source identifying
characteristics. The PTO should not encourage companies to trademark
common words like “walk” and “swim”. These companies can get around the
basic requirements of a trademark by simply adding a simple + to the end of a
verb. The PTO should have refused WCT’s registration of “Bike+” until WCT
was able to prove that “Bike+” had acquired secondary meaning.
E. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

1. Peloton Can Make an Incontestability Argument
The best solution going forward is for the PTO to not issue registrations for
a non-inherently distinctive term attached to a +. This solution, however, does
not help the current case between Peloton and WCT. Because of this, Peloton
should petition to cancel the registration.215
Because the mark “Bike+” was registered in 2015 and used for five
consecutive years thereafter, WCT will argue that the mark has become
incontestable under 15 U.S.C. § 1065. This would mean that Peloton would not
be able to petition to cancel the registration because “the registration shall be
conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark.”216
Peloton would be able to make a case, however, that WCT’s mark is not
incontestable. Whether a court would find “Bike+” to be a generic or descriptive
mark does not matter, in either scenario, because the mark would not be
incontestable.217
2. WCT Can Try to Show Secondary Meaning
Another possible solution would be for WCT to show their mark has acquired
secondary meaning to justify the registration. As stated before, WCT can show
secondary meaning through consumer surveys. Although WCT could show
secondary meaning, the outcome does not appear probable. Although a quick
Google search is not the most conclusive evidence against WCT, the search for

15 U.S.C. § 1127.
15 U.S.C. § 1064.
216 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
217 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (“[N]o incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark which is the
generic name for the goods or services or a portion thereof, for which it is registered”); 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (“That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement
is a use . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only
to describe the goods or services of such party . . .”).
214
215
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the term “Bike+” does not lean in their favor. The page is dominated with links
to and articles about Peloton’s Bike+ stationary bike.218
IV. CONCLUSION
In early 2022, Peloton and World Champ Tech found themselves working
through the settlement process and convened for a settlement conference, with
a settlement likely to be reached.219 Regardless of the outcome of this case, WCT
should never have been able to register “Bike+” as a trademark. The PTO should
not have approved “Bike+” for registration in the first place. As the mark relates
to the app that WCT has developed, “Bike+” does not have any source
identifying characteristics and does not fall within an inherently distinctive
category.
Even giving WCT the benefit of the doubt and conceding that “Bike+” could
fall in the descriptive category, the mark should not have been registered. If the
mark was considered generic, then there would be no need to go any further in
the analysis. The result would have been the same as in In re Hotels.com220 and
Advertise.com221, where the mark is not permitted to be registered and has no
standing to sue for infringement. If “Bike+” is descriptive, WCT could still
justify the registration if they are able to show secondary meaning. But WCT
should have been required to show secondary meaning before the registration
was granted.
Courts may have to begin ruling on using the + with generic and descriptive
marks. The + is a relatively new phenomenon that is becoming more and more
commonplace. As more companies begin to use the symbol in their trademarks,
courts will have to make certain rulings on them and set standards for what
constitutes a protectable mark.
The courts have had to make these decisions regarding “.com” through the
many cases previously discussed. Using the + could become the new trend that
is equivalent to adding “.com” to a term. The PTO and the courts must establish
rules covering the + before people begin to use the symbol to work around the
system.

GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2022) (type “Bike+” in the search
bar).
219 World Champ Tech LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-03202 (N.D. Cal. filed
Apr. 30, 2021).
220 In Re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
221 Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2010).
218
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